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Abstract 
In recent years, many have debated adopting work requirements in the Public Housing 
Program, and eight public housing authorities have implemented these policies through 
the flexibility provided by the Moving to Work demonstration. One such agency – the 
Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA) – has adopted a work requirement across five (of its 
15) public housing developments that mandates heads of household work 15 hours per 
week or face sanctions. This paper evaluates this policy and presents the first empirical 
comparison of employment and eviction rates between those subject to the work 
requirement and a comparison group not subject to the policy. We find that, following 
work requirement enforcement, the percentage of households paying minimum rent (a 
proxy for employment) decreased relative to the comparison group. Analysis of additional 
data on both employment and hours worked indicates similar employment gains, but no 
increase in average hours worked. We find no evidence that work requirement sanctions 
increased evictions, and only modest evidence that enforcement increased the rate of 
positive move-outs. Surveys of CHA residents indicate that a large proportion support 
work requirements in public housing. While our findings clearly support the effectiveness 
of the CHA’s work requirement, we caution against imposing such a requirement before 
more research is conducted.  
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Introduction 
One of the often-heard criticisms of the Public Housing and Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) 
Programs in the U.S. is that they actively discourage employment among program participants.2  Because 
they base rents on 30 percent of adjusted income, 30 cents of every additional dollar earned by 
participants goes to increased rent before work-related expenses and deductions in other social benefit 
programs are considered. Moreover, when incomes rise to a certain level, housing assistance is phased out 
entirely. Calculating rents thusly may be one reason why only 55 percent of work-able (that is, non-elderly 
and non-disabled) public housing tenants have any wage income – and among those, most earn below the 
federal poverty level (Schwartz, 2015). 
Since the mid-1980s, Congress has introduced several demonstration programs and policy 
reforms to increase employment among public housing families. As will be described in more detail below, 
these efforts have sought to overcome disincentives to work by offering positive enticements such as 
escrow accounts and work preparedness services – e.g., employment counseling, education, and job 
training – that address barriers to employment. The success of these programs in increasing employment 
and wages has been limited, however, due to a combination of constrained capacity and lack of resident 
interest (Ficke & Piesse, 2004; Rohe & Kleit, 1999). 
One new approach – so far available only to the 39 public housing authorities (PHAs) 
participating in the Moving to Work demonstration – is imposition of work requirements, which require 
work-able public housing residents to work a minimum number of hours per week (Webb, Frescoln, & 
Rohe, 2015). If residents fail to meet the requirement, sanctions – such as rent increases and eventual 
eviction – are imposed. Many PHAs couple work requirements with supportive services like job training, 
educational assistance, and childcare and transportation subsidies to help residents obtain and maintain 
employment. These policies may also be phased in over time to provide residents with an extended 
opportunity to comply with the new requirements.  
This paper presents the first empirical analysis of the impacts of a work requirement on 
employment. More specifically, it assesses a work requirement introduced by the Charlotte Housing 
Authority (CHA) on residents living in five of its 15 public housing (Section 9) developments on:  (1) the 
work efforts of public housing residents subject to it; (2) the rates of sanction and eviction resulting from its 
enforcement; and (3) tenants’ attitudes toward the work requirement. 
                                            
2 For brevity, we refer to the Public Housing and HCV Programs as the “public housing program” throughout the 
paper. We also refer to participants in these two programs as “public housing residents.” When discussing 
development-based public housing (i.e., Section 9) exclusively, we will refer to these as “public housing (Section 9) 
developments.” 
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Arguments for a work requirement 
Policy-makers, public housing administrators, and other stakeholders have offered several 
arguments in favor of work requirements: (1) to counteract the negative work incentives inherent to the 
program; (2) to increase the financial health of public housing authorities; (3) to serve more low-income 
families in need of subsidized housing; and (4) to increase economic diversity and establish an 
environment of work among residents in low-income housing developments.  
Negative work incentives 
Many policy-makers and much of the public believe that work-able public housing residents 
should make every effort to increase their incomes so they no longer need housing subsidies. Moreover, 
there is concern that some public housing residents are not doing that. As stated earlier, recent figures 
show that almost half of households classified as having a work-able adult report no wage income. Some 
critics argue that relatively low rates of employment among work-able public housing residents result 
from lack of personal motivation (Mead, 1998). Michael Leavitt, Secretary of Health and Human Services 
under George W. Bush, invoked the personal motivation perspective by arguing that “[a] critical benefit of 
strong work expectation and activities is the ability to acclimate recipients to a working lifestyle – not 
simply learning how to do a specific job, but to learn through experience what it takes to be employed and 
remain employed” (Fording, Schram, & Soss, 2013, p. 646). 
Other critics highlight aspects endemic to the public housing program that undermine work 
incentives, thus causing relatively low employment rates among residents. First, program participants 
feel less pressure to work if housing – one of life’s basic needs – is ensured (Olsen, Tyler, King, & Carrillo, 
2005; Susin, 2005). Second, public housing rents are based on a percentage of household incomes,3 which, 
in effect, levies a substantial tax on earnings (Riccio, 2008). These higher rents – coupled with reductions 
in other benefits that often accompany wage increases – may offset any additional income earned 
(Newman, 1999).  
By imposing work requirements, PHAs hope to overcome these disincentives by requiring 
residents to gain employment to continue living in public housing. PHAs see work requirements as 
providing a strong disincentive to unemployment for work-able program participants – particularly when 
paired with rent reforms that allow residents to retain more of their income increases.  
                                            
3 Except in some situations in the HCV Program, public housing rents are set at 30 percent of the household’s income, 
adjusted for deductions like childcare and out-of-pocket medical expenses. 
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PHA financial health 
Another argument for work requirements is that they will increase PHAs’ financial health at a 
time of declining federal subsidies. Since 1969 – when the federal government stipulated that rents must 
be based on a percentage of tenants’ adjusted incomes – the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) has provided operating subsidies to fill the gap between tenant rent receipts and the 
costs of operating the units (von Hoffman, 2012). The importance of these subsidies has grown over time. 
By 2003, operating subsidies made up about half of a typical PHA’s operating budget (McClure, Schwartz, 
& Taghavi, 2015; Stockard et al., 2003). In recent years, however, Congress has consistently allocated less 
operating support to PHAs than called for under the HUD formula. Thus, PHAs must either find other 
sources of funds to close this gap or reduce spending (Levitz, 2013). If effective, work requirements can 
increase tenant incomes – and, as a result, rent receipts – thus improving PHAs’ bottom lines.  
Serving more families 
Work requirements may also open up the limited supply of public housing for other low-income 
residents. A key feature of the public housing program is that it is not an entitlement: qualified households 
are not guaranteed to receive assistance. Because Congress has consistently underfunded public housing 
operating subsidies, only approximately one-quarter of all qualified households receive housing assistance 
(Schwartz, 2015). As a result, most PHAs have long waiting lists, and households can wait 10 or more 
years to receive assistance. Insufficient funding further means that millions of households receive no 
assistance and are living in “worst case” housing conditions – defined as those paying more than 50 
percent of their incomes for rent or living in dilapidated or overcrowded housing (Steffen et al., 2015). One 
way to serve more families is to cycle recipients through the program more rapidly. Graduating people out 
of public housing and off housing assistance opens up opportunities for those on waiting lists. Thus, to the 
extent that work requirements lead to income increases and subsequent moves to unsubsidized housing, 
the policy will result in more eligible families being served.  
Increase economic diversity and create a culture of work  
Another argument for work requirements is that they can help diversify the income 
characteristics of public housing residents and lessen the negative impacts of concentrated poverty on 
individuals and communities (Falk, McCarty, & Aussenberg, 2014). The public housing program has 
always been targeted to households that could not reasonably afford private-market housing. Over time, 
however, federal proscriptions for who should have priority for the limited amount of housing assistance 
have changed dramatically, resulting in a concentration of very low-income households living in public 
housing (Section 9) developments (von Hoffman, 2012). Although more recent federal policy has sought to 
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address this concentration, as of 2013, the annual average income of public housing households was only 
$13,724, and only 18 percent had incomes over $20,000 (Schwartz, 2015). 
Critics of public housing assert that it both concentrates high-poverty families and is racially 
segregated, and numerous studies have demonstrated that spatially-concentrating very low-income 
households can exacerbate crime and other behaviors commonly associated with the “culture of poverty” 
(Briggs, Popkin, & Goering, 2010; Goetz, 2013; Lewis, 1959; Massey & Denton, 1993; Reingold, Van 
Ryzin, & Ronda, 2001; Turner, Popkin, & Rawlings, 2009; Vale, 2000; Wilson, 1987). Further, many 
believe that individuals will be more likely to engage in work and other socially-responsible behaviors if 
they are living in a community that exhibits and values these behaviors (Graves, 2011; Joseph, Chaskin, 
& Webber, 2007; Kleit, 2005). If successful, work requirements can increase employment in public 
housing, thus reducing concentrations of poverty and creating a social milieu of work.  
Arguments against a work requirement  
Not everyone, however, is supportive of public housing work requirements. Social justice 
advocates argue that safe and affordable housing should be a basic human right and that policies that 
interfere with this right – such as work requirements – are unjust. The National Low Income Housing 
Coalition, for example, has come out firmly against them, arguing that “self-sufficiency contracts and time 
limits should [not] be allowed in federal housing safety net programs” (Couch, 2014, 4-18–4-19). The 
primary arguments against public housing work requirements are that: (1) they infringe on individuals’ 
“right to housing;” (2) the characteristics of public housing residents present major obstacles for finding 
and maintaining employment; and (3) work requirements may lead to an increase in homelessness. 
A right to housing 
In recent years, many activists have called for a “right to housing” – that is, the belief that 
everyone has the right to decent, safe, and secure housing regardless of personal circumstances (Bratt, 
Stone, & Hartman, 2006; Bratt, 2002; Edgar, Doherty, & Meert, 2002; Stone, 1993). From this 
perspective, imposing work requirements as a condition of housing assistance is seen as unfair. Rachel 
Bratt, a prominent advocate for such a right, wrote “I would only favor work requirements in public 
housing if everyone who gets some kind of housing subsidy (including those who take the home 
mortgage interest deduction) is subject to the same requirements”  (emphasis in original) (Bratt, personal 
communication, July 22, 2015). Bratt asks, “What is the justification for singling out a poor public housing 
resident who may, in fact, get a lower subsidy amount than a wealthy homeowner [who takes the 
mortgage interest deduction]?” Moreover, she argues that any kind of work mandate should be supported 
by a comprehensive set of services including caseworkers and job counselors (Bratt, personal 
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communication, July 22, 2015). Evicting non-compliant residents – who are already low-income – is seen 
by many resident advocates as unfairly targeting already vulnerable families (Fischer, 2015). 
Barriers to employment 
Public housing residents often have personal characteristics – such as limited education, poor 
health, and limited work histories – that make it difficult to find and keep employment, even in a good 
economy. Tenant advocates argue that: “. . . tenants should not have to do x, y, or z unrelated to complying 
with the housing-related terms of their lease to maintain their housing assistance. Work requirements 
threaten the housing stability of tenants, who may well have erratic working experiences but nonetheless 
need housing” (Linda Couch, personal communication, July 22, 2015). Evidence from work requirements 
imposed under Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) indicates that sanctioned households 
face more barriers to compliance: they have more children, less work experience, an ill or disabled housing 
member, or other significant obstacle to employment (Hasenfeld, Ghose, & Larson, 2004).  
Increased homelessness  
Another argument against work requirements is that, as PHAs evict non-compliant families, they 
may substantially increase homelessness. This, then, may shift the burden of housing these families to 
local homeless assistance agencies, resulting in a need for increased public funds to re-house these 
households. It may also have dramatic short- and long-term impacts on social services needed by evicted 
households. In discussing the possible impacts of work requirements and time limits, Fischer (2015) 
suggests that they could significantly undermine the voucher program’s effectiveness in reducing 
homelessness, overcrowding, and housing instability. 
Prior efforts to address employment among public housing tenants 
Concerns about the concentration of unemployment and poverty in public housing have been 
long-standing, and HUD has introduced several policies and programs to address them. Unlike punitive 
work requirements, most of these initiatives have either incentivized employment or increased the 
employability of public housing residents. These efforts, however, have been limited in scope and 
effectiveness (Ficke & Piesse, 2004; Rohe & Kleit, 1999). 
One set of initiatives falls into the category of “self-sufficiency” programs, in which PHAs 
collaborate with local service providers to offer education, job training, and other supports so that program 
participants can increase their incomes and move to unsubsidized housing. Introduced in 1984, the first 
such initiative – Project Self Sufficiency – provided additional vouchers to PHAs that developed programs 
to help residents achieve “economic independence,” defined as no longer requiring federal housing 
assistance (Office of Policy Development and Research, 1987). Implemented locally by a coordinating 
committee of representatives from the PHA and local service providers, each program conducted 
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individualized assessments of participants and provided case managers to help participants secure 
services. The Gateway Transitional Families Program incentivized employment by diverting rent 
increases following wage gains into escrow accounts that participants could use to support their work or 
training efforts and move to unsubsidized housing (Rohe & Kleit, 1997). 
Experience with these demonstrations led to the development of the Family Self-Sufficiency (FSS) 
Program, authorized in 1990 and still active today. Like earlier self-sufficiency programs, FSS escrows 
some rent increases that result from wage gains (Rohe & Kleit, 1999). In fiscal year 2012, 68,548 HCV 
recipients and 14,386 public housing residents participated in FSS (Scirè, 2013). While these figures are 
not trivial, they represent a very small percentage of work-able public housing residents. Furthermore, 
evaluations of FSS indicate that a large percentage of participants leave the program prior to completion 
(de Silva, Wijewardena, Wood, & Kaul, 2011). HUD also currently supports two smaller self-sufficiency 
programs: the Resident Opportunity and Self-Sufficiency (ROSS) and Community and Supportive 
Services (CSS) program for HOPE VI grantees. 
Another approach to addressing low employment rates among public housing residents is 
embodied in the Jobs-Plus Demonstration, initially implemented in six different sites. Introduced in 1996, 
Jobs-Plus seeks to create a community-wide culture of work by providing residents with job training and 
job placement assistance. Like FSS, Jobs-Plus also delays rent increases due to increased incomes; some 
sites charged residents flat rents that increased over time, while others reduced the percentage of income 
that residents paid toward rent (Bloom, Riccio, & Verma, 2005). Case managers help residents locate both 
training and employment opportunities. Finally, each Jobs-Plus site undertook several activities to 
strengthen community support for work. These included the development of peer support groups, work-
related information-sharing, and other “work-supporting social capital.” HUD recently funded another 
pilot program that replicates the basic program model in nine PHAs (Castro Ramirez, 2015).  
Congress also addressed employment among public housing residents in several provisions of the 
1998 Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA, P.L. 105-276). Community Service and 
FSS provisions within QHWRA require residents of public housing (Section 9) developments (but not 
HCV holders) to perform eight hours of community service or participate in a self-sufficiency program for 
at least eight hours monthly.4  QHWRA directs PHAs to not renew leases for those failing to satisfy the 
requirement, although households are given three months to come into compliance. Moreover, PHAs 
must seek cooperative agreements with local agencies to provide services and help residents comply with 
                                            
4 The act also includes a long list of persons who are exempt from this requirement, including those who are already 
working, in a training program, elderly or disabled, and other groups. 
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community service requirements. Because QHWRA does not explicitly require paid employment, 
however, it falls short of what work requirement supporters would like to see. 
To incentivize employment, QHWRA also includes several provisions that impact rents paid by 
residents. First, it authorizes PHAs to set minimum monthly rents – no greater than $50 per month – and 
agencies must develop a process for determining hardship exemptions for minimum rents; possible 
hardships include a death in the family and the “prospect of eviction” (Falk et al., 2014). Second, QHWRA 
also authorizes transitional ceiling rents – where rents are capped at an upper-limit for a specified period 
of time – to allow households to save funds for the costs of moving into unsubsidized housing. Finally, 
QHWRA allows PHAs to disregard wages from household members who were previously unemployed or 
on TANF for up to 12 months, and then to phase in rent increases over time. This is designed to, at least 
temporarily, mitigate the negative work incentives for some public housing residents. 
Work sanctions in the TANF program 
Given the lack of prior research on impacts of public housing work requirements, we turn to the 
public welfare field to see what might be expected. Requirements that welfare recipients seek employment 
have long been part of welfare programs (Hasenfeld et al., 2004). The Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA, P. L. 104-193, commonly known as “welfare reform”), 
however, substantially strengthened both work requirements and sanctions for the Temporary Aid to 
Needy Families (TANF) program (Fording et al., 2013). Non-compliant households would have their 
benefit levels reduced and eventually terminated. U.S. states, however, have discretion to implement 
various sanctions, such as reducing benefits for just the adult or for the entire family, and/or whether to 
impose a partial or full reduction of benefits. A majority of states have adopted especially severe sanctions 
that involve the total loss of benefits for both adults and children until the recipient complies with the 
work requirement (Floyd, Pavetti, & Schott, 2015). Specific work requirements also vary by state, but 
TANF stipulates that states must have half of participants involved in work activities for at least 30 hours 
per week (or 20 hours for single parents with small children) or face a fiscal penalty.  
Research on welfare reform impacts consistently find that the percentage of TANF-eligible 
families participating in the program has decreased dramatically since its implementation. A recent U.S. 
Government Accountability Office report, for example, indicates that eligible families receiving TANF 
decreased from 84 percent to 40 percent (Brown, 2010), and there is general agreement that the work 
sanctions have greatly contributed to the overall decline in client caseloads (Fording, 2013). Recent 
research has shown that TANF work requirements have had a greater effect in reducing welfare rolls 
than time limits (also authorized through PRWORA), and that “[i]n FY 2010, 260,000 families had their 
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TANF case benefits ended because of refusal to comply with work requirements” (Falk et al., 2014, pp. 19-
20). 
Research on the impacts of sanctions on clients, however, has been less clear (Fording et al., 2013). 
The best-designed studies generally find that sanctioned clients experience lower earnings and greater 
hardship after exiting the program compared to unsanctioned clients. In analyzing longitudinal data from 
Florida, Fording et al. (2013, p. 669) report that “sanctioning has a statistically-significant negative effect 
on earnings among TANF clients” when compared to a matched sample of non-sanctioned clients. 
Regarding the characteristics of sanctioned households, Hasenfeld et al. (2004) found that 
sanctioned welfare recipients in California are more likely to be disadvantaged and face more barriers to 
compliance compared to non-sanctioned ones. In particular, sanctioned recipients were more likely to be 
younger, have more children, lack a car, or have a disabled household member. They conclude that work 
requirement compliance is closely related to barriers to employment, not resistance to the policy. In 
addition, they suggest that when welfare policies acknowledge and accommodate these barriers, impacted 
recipients are less likely to face sanctions. They also argue that practices of local welfare offices are a 
significant factor in the sanctioning of recipients. Thus, it is not just the sanctions themselves but how they 
are administered that may determine their impacts.  
Based on the research outlined above, we expect that public housing work requirements would 
have negative impacts on employment and earnings due to increased housing instability. Furthermore, 
we would expect that the most vulnerable program participants are most likely to face sanctions and 
potential eviction. As noted by Hasenfeld et al. (2004), however, if work requirements are specified and 
implemented in a manner that recognizes and addresses barriers to compliance, these policies may have a 
positive impact on employment without increasing the rate of tenant evictions.  
Experience with work requirements  
Moving to Work demonstration 
Several PHAs have implemented work requirements through participation in HUD’s Moving to 
Work demonstration program. Authorized by Congress in 1996, Moving to Work (MTW, P.L. 104-134) 
provides PHAs the ability to explore innovative ways of providing decent and affordable housing to low- 
and moderate-income households (Abravanel et al., 2004). MTW has three statutory goals: (1) increase 
housing choices for low-income households, (2) assist participating households in achieving self-sufficiency, 
and (3) deliver services in more cost-effective ways. To achieve these goals, participating PHAs are 
provided two flexibilities. First, they may combine their primary federal funding streams – such as 
operating, Housing Choice Voucher Program, and capital improvement funds – into a single, flexible 
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account. Second, PHAs may request waivers from various HUD regulations, such as how often to inspect 
voucher holders’ units or whether to introduce a work requirement. 
Among the 39 PHAs participating in MTW as of July 2015, eight have implemented work 
requirements;5 participants subject to these policies must work a specified amount or face sanctions 
(Webb et al., 2015).6  Required work efforts vary between 15 and 30 hours per week, and sanctions for 
non-compliance include reductions in housing subsidy (i.e., higher rents) and/or eviction. Most PHAs with 
work requirements allow households to fulfill the policy – at least for a limited time – through education, 
job training, or other work-related activities. Despite MTW’s classification as a demonstration program, 
HUD has not sponsored any systematic evaluation of work requirement impacts. 
CHA’s work requirement 
The Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA) joined MTW in December 2007, and has implemented 
several major initiatives through the program (Rohe, Webb, & Frescoln, 2015). These include rent reforms 
– including a $75 minimum rent and incentive accounts for all residents, diversifying its housing portfolio 
by partnering with other agencies to develop supportive housing for the homeless, and a work 
requirement paired with on-site case management in five of its 15 public housing (Section 9) 
developments.  
The CHA’s work requirement stipulates that work-able heads of household are employed at least 
15 hours per week. The CHA provides on-site case managers to help residents meet the work 
requirement, such as referring them to job placement programs. Residents may use “work-related 
activities” to fulfill the policy; these include community service, educational courses, and/or job training. 
Non-compliant residents face rent sanctions. These include, in order: (1) a two-month probationary 
period,7 (2) losing half their rental subsidy for six months, (3) complete loss of rental subsidy for six 
months, and (4) eviction. Residents may eliminate sanctions at any point by coming into compliance, 
either by working or completing work-related activities through an “Improvement Plan,” which entails 
weekly meetings with their case managers. 
                                            
5 Atlanta, Champaign County (IL), Charlotte, Chicago, the Delaware State Housing Authority, Lawrence-Douglas 
County (KS), Louisville, and San Bernardino. 
6 Several other MTW agencies have implemented policies that function as quasi-work requirements – such as raising 
minimum rents to a level (e.g., $200 per month) – whereby tenants would almost certainly need some wage income to 
meet the rent payment. Note, however, that these policies do not require PHAs to verify whether participants are 
employed. 
7 The two-month period is to provide legal notice to the tenant that his/her rent will be increased, and to complete the 
necessary administrative tasks. The CHA provided a one-time three-month probationary period at the beginning of 
sanctions. 
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Among the five work requirement sites, two (Claremont and Victoria Square) previously housed 
only participants in the CHA’s FSS program. As such, residents had applied to and been accepted into the 
FSS program, had relocated to these developments, and were receiving on-site case management prior to 
work requirement implementation.  The other three sites (Cedar Knoll, Leafcrest, and Tarlton Hills) were 
not FSS sites; residents of these developments were not participating in any self-sufficiency program 
when the work requirement was introduced. Instead, the CHA selected these sites because of their 
proximity to both transit and employment opportunities. The agency did not allow residents to transfer to 
non-work requirement developments prior to implementation, and began providing case management at 
these sites in September 2011. 
The CHA initially planned to enforce the work requirement in September 2012, one year after 
beginning case management at the non-FSS sites. However, high unemployment rates in Charlotte and 
staff turnover caused the CHA to delay enforcement until January 2014. Households received notification 
in October 2013 that enforcement would begin in January, and all non-compliant households were urged 
to find employment either on their own or with help from their case manager. Prior to implementing 
sanctions, case managers reassessed residents’ work ability and temporarily exempted 32 households (of 
139 eligible) from the policy while they sought disability status.  
Evaluation Design 
Adopting Cook and Campbell’s (1979) terminology and notation, our evaluation uses a modified 
“untreated comparison group with pretest and posttest” research design. The design is: 
 Treatment Group: O1 X1 O2 X2 O3 
 Comparison Group: O1   O2   O3 
Where: O denotes observations and X denotes treatments. Observations (data collection) of our 
dependent variables took place during three time periods for both the Treatment and Comparison 
Groups. The first treatment (X1) was the introduction of case management and enhanced services in 
September 2011. The second treatment (X2) was the introduction of sanctions for non-compliant 
households in January 2014. 
Analysis comprises difference-in-differences tests of work outcomes between the Treatment and 
Comparison Groups between O1 and O2, and between O2 and O3. To control for households entering and 
leaving the CHA, we construct a panel dataset of families living in CHA housing in both September 2011 
and December 2014. If case management was effective in increasing employment, we would expect to see 
significantly greater employment gains for the Treatment Group between O1 and O2 relative to the 
Comparison Group. If the combination of case management, services, and sanctions were effective, we 
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would expect to see significantly greater employment gains between O2 and O3 for the Treatment Group 
versus the Comparison Group. 
As mentioned above, the Treatment and Comparison Groups were not equivalent at baseline – a 
common problem with quasi-experimental research. Residents of Claremont and Victoria Square had 
opted in to the FSS program and were receiving case management and supportive services prior to work 
requirement implementation. In the analysis presented below, we refer to this group as Treatment Group 
A.  
In contrast, residents of the non-FSS developments had not made any affirmative choice to move 
toward self-sufficiency. We refer to this group as Treatment Group B. Given the different histories and 
characteristics of residents of these two sets of developments, the data analysis will consider them both 
together and separately. 
One would expect that residents in both treatment subgroups and in the Comparison Group (i.e., 
non-work requirement developments) have different household characteristics (see Table 1). To address 
these differences, we employ nearest-neighborhood propensity score matching using income sources (e.g., 
wages, disability, medical allowances) and household size at the beginning of the study period. Given the 
size disparity between the Comparison and Treatment Groups – in addition to relatively small size of the 
Treatment Groups – we use 3:1 matching without replacement (Guo & Fraser, 2010; Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1985). Table 1 compares both the Treatment and Comparison Groups on both household size and 
income sources at the beginning of the study period. Difference-of-means t-tests reveal that the matched 
Comparison and Treatment Groups are not significantly different on any of the characteristics analyzed. 
However, because differences between the Control and Treatment Groups continue to exist, we utilize 
several of these characteristics as controls in the difference-in-differences regressions. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of treatment group and matched and unmatched control groups 
 
Data sources 
This paper draws upon data from four sources. First, we utilize CHA administrative data – 
specifically from the Multifamily Tenant Characteristics System (MTCS) – which report households’ size, 
Unmatched control Matched control Treatment
N=341 N=219 N=73
Household size 2.93 3.16 3.01
Wage income $2,934* $3,890 $4,633
Non-wage income $2,302 $2,534 $3,024
Total income $5,237** $6,253 $6,988
Total allowances $1,739 $1,824 $1,664
Adjusted income $3,805** $4,760 $5,613
Variable
* - Significant difference with treatment group at α=0.10
** - Significant difference with treatment group at α=0.05
12 
income from various sources (e.g., wages, child support, pensions, and social security), and rent paid. 
However, when the CHA implemented biennial income re-certifications in October 2013, it ceased 
reporting household income changes between re-certifications. For those tenants paying minimum rent 
($75), however, the CHA continues to verify their income monthly. As such, we utilize minimum rent as a 
proxy for employment in one of the subsequent analyses.8 As mentioned earlier, to control for households 
entering and leaving the CHA, we construct a panel dataset of families living in CHA housing in both 
September 2011 and December 2014.  We also source sanctions for non-compliance and the number and 
reasons for tenants leaving the CHA (e.g., evictions) from administrative data.  
Second, we analyze End-of-Month (EOM) data collected by on-site case managers to track 
residents’ work efforts. Unlike the MTCS, EOM data includes information on whether a client is working 
and, if so, the number of hours worked per week. We similarly construct a panel of residents living with 
the CHA in December 2012 and December 2014 for EOM data analysis. While there is no comparable 
data for residents in the Comparison Group, EOM data provide direct information on employment 
changes over time. 
Third, we draw on responses from two population surveys of tenants of the CHA’s family 
conventional public housing (Section 9) developments conducted in 2013 (when the work requirement had 
been announced but not yet enforced) and 2015 (roughly one year after beginning enforcement). The 
surveys queried respondents’ perceptions of, and responses to, the work requirement. The 2013 survey 
received 548 responses for a return rate of 54 percent, while 519 households returned the 2015 survey for 
a response rate of 53 percent. 
Finally, we present data from 43 in-person interviews with CHA residents living in the five work 
requirement sites. These interviews covered topics including resident responses to the work requirement, 
perceptions of its fairness, and satisfaction with case management. 
Findings 
MTCS analysis 
We begin analysis of the MTCS panel data by graphing the percentage of minimum renters 
between a baseline of September 2011 (when case management began for Treatment Group B) and 
                                            
8 Households who are minimum renters earn less than $3,000 annually in total income, adjusted for various 
allowances (e.g., out-of-pocket medical expenses or elderly/disabled household members). Residents may cease being a 
minimum renter for several reasons, including gaining employment or beginning to earn benefits, such as welfare or 
disability. As case managers work with residents to both gain employment and enroll in appropriate benefits 
programs, we feel that paying minimum rent is a good proxy of the effectiveness of supportive services and the work 
requirement. 
13 
December 2014 (see Figure 1). At baseline, 54 percent of Comparison Group households paid minimum 
rent; this figure fluctuated modestly between 62 percent (in June 2012) and 51 percent (in December 
2013) but stood at 55 percent in December 2014, one percentage point higher than baseline. For 
Treatment Group B – the non-FSS sites – 61 percent of households paid minimum rent at baseline, but 
that figure declined to 31 percent by December 2014. As one would expect, fewer Treatment Group A 
residents paid minimum rent at baseline (31%). That figure rose to 45 percent in September 2012 before 
decreasing to 24 percent in December 2014. The decline in minimum renters among Treatment Group B 
was relatively steady throughout the study period but accelerates after enforcement of the work 
requirement. The decline in minimum renters among Treatment Group A also accelerates after March 
2014, one quarter after work requirement enforcement began. 
Figure 1: Percent of Comparison and Treatment Group households paying minimum rent, September 2011–
December 2014. Line denotes work requirement enforcement. 
 
To test whether the introduction of Treatment 1 – on-site case management and supportive 
services – had a statistically-significant impact on the percentage of minimum renters, we conduct a 
difference-in-differences analysis between both Treatment Groups and the Comparison Group from 
September 2011 to December 2013 – the month before work requirement enforcement began. The change 
in minimum renters among the Comparison Group was minus 3 percent over this time period, while for 
Treatment Group B it was minus 14 percent, an 11 point difference of differences (see Figure 1). The 
percent of Treatment Group A residents paying minimum rent actually increased by 5 percentage points. 
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A regression model testing whether the difference-of-differences between each of the Treatment 
Groups and the Comparison Group – controlling for baseline indicators of adjusted income, age, and 
household size – indicates that changes in minimum renters for both Treatment Groups are not 
significantly different from those of the Comparison Group (see Table 2). This indicates that on-site case 
management alone did not decrease the percentage of minimum renters in the two Treatment Groups in 
a statistically-significant manner.  
Table 2: Difference-in-differences test of Treatment 1 (case management alone) on Comparison and Treatment 
Groups. Treatment variables that are statistically significant are in bold. 
 
In contrast, a difference-in-differences test indicates that Treatment 2 – work sanctions in 
addition to case management – did have a statistically-significant impact on the proportion of minimum 
renters (see Table 3). Between December 2013 (one month before sanctions began) and December 2014, 
the percentage of Comparison Group minimum renters increased by 4 percent, while the percentage 
among Treatment Group B decreased by 17 percent, a 21 point difference in differences. The percentage of 
minimum renters among Treatment Group A decreased by 12 percent resulting in a 16 point difference in 
differences. The regression model indicates a statistically-significant difference in the decreases between 
the Comparison Group and both Treatment Groups. 
Table 3: Difference-in-differences test on outcome of Treatment 2 (case management and work requirement 
enforcement) on Treatment and Comparison Groups. Treatment variables that are statistically significant are in bold. 
 
EOM analysis 
Results of EOM data analysis – which reports hours worked for those receiving case management 
– are consistent with the MTCS results presented above:  the percentage of employed residents in both 
Treatment Groups A and B increased substantially following work requirement enforcement in January 
2014 (see Figure 2). The average hours worked among employed households, however, did not show a 
Variable B Beta t sig
If in Treatment Group A 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.95
If in Treatment Group B 0.07 0.05 0.83 0.41
Adjusted income -0.03 -0.40 -7.17 0.00
Age 0.00 -0.08 -1.30 0.19
Household size -0.02 -0.05 -0.83 0.41
(Constant) 0.41 2.56 0.01
Treatment
Controls
Variable B Beta t sig
If in Treatment Group A 0.23 0.15 2.54 0.01
If in Treatment Group B 0.23 0.18 3.05 0.00
Adjusted Income (000s) -0.01 -0.15 -2.58 0.01
Age 0.01 0.12 1.88 0.06
Household size 0.04 0.11 1.81 0.07
(Constant) -0.31 -2.07 0.04
Treatment
Controls
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similar increase; it remains between 25 and 30 despite the additional households working.9 Unlike the 
MTCS data presented above, EOM data is only collected for those at the work requirement sites, and thus 
no Comparison Group data is available. 
Figure 2: Employment for residents active in case management. Line denotes work requirement enforcement. 
 
To test whether Treatments 1 and/or 2 resulted in statistically-significant employment gains, we 
utilize a McNemar test of marginal homogeneity to evaluate changes in EOM-reported employment for 
the 12-month periods both prior to and following work requirement enforcement (December 2012–
December 2013 and December 2013–December 2014, respectively). We draw on panel data of work 
requirement residents between December 2012 and December 2014. The McNemar test analyzes 
changes in proportions of dichotomous characteristics (such as working or not working) on data and is 
thus appropriate for this analysis (Rice, 1995). 
                                            
9 In additional analyses (available from the authors), we examined average hours worked between those employed 
before work requirement enforcement and those who gained employment following enforcement. We found that, 
among those previously working, hours worked did not increase following work requirement enforcement for either 
Treatment Group A or B (between 30-35 and 25-30 hours, respectively). Those gaining employment following 
enforcement worked slightly fewer hours, on average, than households previously employed (between 25-30 hours for 
Treatment Group A and 20-25 hours for Treatment Group B). 
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In December 2012 – one year prior to the introduction of sanctions10 and 15 months following the 
beginning of case management – 51.3 percent (39 of 76) of work requirement residents were employed 
(see Table 4, top panel). While this figure increased to 58 percent (44 of 76) in December 2013 – 
immediately before enforcement of the work requirement – this gain is not statistically significant 
(McNemar statistic of 1.19, p=0.353). However, by December 2014, 88 percent (67 of 76) of work 
requirement residents were employed; this increase over December 2013 figures is statistically significant 
at the α=0.001 level (see Table 4, bottom panel). These results support findings from the MTCS analysis: 
case management alone did not result in statistically-significant increases in work efforts, while case 
management combined with work requirement enforcement did coincide with significant employment 
gains. 
Table 4: McNemar test on employment rates, December 2012–December 2013 and December 2013–December 2014 
 
Work requirement compliance, sanctions, and move-outs 
To investigate compliance and sanctions associated with the work requirement, we turn to CHA 
enforcement data. The data indicate that a large majority of residents are compliant with the work 
requirement and that compliance has increased substantially over time (see Figure 3). While 25 and 26 
non-compliant residents were placed on an Improvement Plan (i.e., they were non-compliant but had no 
rent sanction) in April and May, this number decreased to seven in June and remained under ten 
throughout the remainder of 2014. The number of residents remaining non-compliant for more than three 
months and, thus, receiving a 50 percent rent sanction varies between two and four; all told, only six 
                                            
10 Note that, at this time, residents were unaware when the CHA would begin enforcing the work requirement in 
January 2014. 
Unemployed Employed
Unemployed 24 13 37
Employed 8 31 39
32 44 76
Unemployed Employed
Unemployed 7 25 32
Employed 2 42 44
9 67 76
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 2
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 1
McNemar statistic: 19.59
p<0.001
McNemar statistic: 1.19
p=0.383
Total
Total
Total
Total
December 2014
December 2013
December 
2013
December 
2012
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unique residents were sanctioned between July and December 2014. Of those households, only one was 
evicted due to non-payment of the increased rent.  
Figure 3: Work requirement sanctions levied, April–December 2014 
 
The decrease in households on Improvement Plans in June 2014 is due to 14 completing work-
related activities, three gaining employment, and two receiving disability status.  Among those 
transitioning to work-related activities in June, eight later gained employment in 2014. 
As discussed earlier, work requirement proponents hope these policies will increase positive move-
outs from public housing, thus freeing up units for households on often-lengthy PHA waitlists. In contrast, 
policy opponents fear that work requirements will result in greater evictions, especially for the most 
vulnerable residents.  
To compare the number and rate of positive and negative move-outs in both work requirement 
sites and other CHA public housing (Section 9) developments, we compare data in both 2013 (the year 
prior to work requirement enforcement) and 2014 (the year following enforcement). Positive move-outs 
occur when CHA tenants move to unsubsidized housing, while negative move-outs (i.e., evictions) follow 
failure to pay rent, violating lease terms, or moving without notice.  
We find that positive move-outs increased for the former FSS sites (Treatment Group A) from 1.2 
percent of tenants in 2013 to 8.5 percent in 2014 (see Table 5). However, we did not find this increase for 
the non-FSS work requirement sites. The positive move-out rate for households not subject to the work 
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requirement increased modestly, from 1.0 percent to 1.2 percent. While we find some evidence that work 
requirement enforcement increased the rate of positive move-outs, we caution that the numbers presented 
here are small, and that this analysis does not use the panel data presented earlier. 
Table 5: Move-out rates for CHA’s public housing residents, 2013–2014 
 
Concerning negative move-outs, the eviction rate fell dramatically in Treatment Group A – from 
7.3 percent in 2013 to 0 percent in 2014 – while it held steady for Treatment Group B (5.4% in both years). 
The eviction rate for tenants not subject to the work requirement showed a modest decrease (from 3.1% to 
2.7%) over the two years. Thus, we find no evidence that work requirement enforcement increased the 
eviction rates for households subject to the policy. 
Resident views and responses 
To gauge support for work requirements among CHA residents, the 2013 client survey asked 
respondents if they felt work requirements for public housing residents were fair. We anticipated that 
support for the policy among residents subject to the work requirement would be lower than the support 
from those not impacted. Contrary to our expectations, 87 percent of residents subject to the work 
requirement believed the policy was fair compared to 80 percent of other public housing residents who felt 
the same way. Among those who did not believe the policy was fair, the most frequent reasons given were 
the lack of available jobs and difficulty securing employment.  
The 2015 survey – conducted one year after work requirement enforcement – queried how 
residents had responded to the policy. Over half of all work-able respondents indicated that they had 
looked for a job, while over one-third reported they had found a new job (see Table 6). Slightly less than 
one-third indicated they had enrolled in a school or training program, and 22 percent reported they had 
begun working more hours. Finally, 19 percent of respondents indicated that they had not undertaken 
any of these activities. 
2013 2014
#  (%) # (%)
Conventional Negative 60 (3.1) 52 (2.7)
(Comparison Group) Positive 20 (1.0) 23 (1.2)
Former FSS Negative 6 (7.3) 0 (0)
(Treatment Group A) Positive 1 (1.2) 7 (8.5)
Non-FSS Negative 8 (5.4) 8 (5.4)
(Treatment Group B) Positive 2 (1.4) 1 (0.7)
Negative 74 (3.4) 60 (2.8)
Positive 23 (1.1) 31 (1.4)
Type of 
Move-outHousing
Total
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Table 6: Client actions in response to the work requirement (respondents could check more than one response) 
 
In-person interviews with residents subject to the work requirement also revealed broad support 
for the policy. One resident commented: “I just think if you have a roof over your head that’s reasonable 
rent, you get help from all over the place, and you get transportation…. Work! That’s just it.”  While most 
agreed that a work requirement is appropriate, many residents did not support evicting residents for not 
meeting that requirement, especially for circumstances beyond their control. For example, one resident 
worried that “[t]here may come a time when I have childcare issues and I lose my job. I pray that they are 
a little lenient towards those who are trying versus those that are not putting out the effort.” 
Conclusions and policy implications  
In recent years, many have debated adopting public housing work requirements, and several 
PHAs have implemented these policies through MTW flexibility. To date, however, no systematic 
evaluation of work requirement outcomes has been conducted. This paper provides the results of the first 
research addressing this important issue.  
Utilizing panel data to analyze a work requirement introduced by the Charlotte Housing 
Authority in five public housing (Section 9) developments, this paper has addressed three questions. First, 
did either case management alone or paired with a work requirement increase employment among 
residents versus those who did not receive these treatments?  Comparing the percentages of households 
paying minimum rent – a proxy for employment – we find larger decreases in minimum renters among 
both Treatment Groups compared to the Comparison Group. That decrease, however, was only 
statistically significant following enforcement of the work requirement, not for the period when households 
were receiving case management alone. 
End-of-Month data analysis on employment finds similar results: employment increased 
significantly following work requirement enforcement. Among those working, however, work requirement 
enforcement did not increase average hours worked. These results show that, by themselves, case 
management and enhanced services did not result in a statistically-significant increase in employment. 
The combination of case management and work requirement enforcement, however, did have such an 
impact. 
Second, this paper has addressed whether work requirement enforcement led to sanctioning 
and/or increased eviction or positive move-out rates among impacted residents. We find that the number 
Response to work requirement #  (%)
Look for a new job 33 (52)
Find a new job 23 (37)
Enroll in a school or training program 19 (30)
Work more hours 14 (22)
None of the above 12 (19)
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of sanctioned residents is low, and that compliance with the work requirement has increased over time. In 
fact, only six households received a rent sanction between May and December 2014, and only one 
household was evicted due to failure to pay the higher rent. We also find that the negative move-out rate 
among work requirement tenants declined between 2013 (pre-enforcement) and 2014 (post-enforcement), 
which was consistent with the pattern of negative move-outs in the non-work requirement sites. 
Similarly, the rate of positive move-outs from the work requirement sites increased between 2013–2014, 
which was consistent with CHA developments not subject to the work requirement. 
Overall, we find no evidence that sanctions increased evictions or other forms of negative move-
outs. This is likely due to the CHA’s emphasis on helping tenants reach compliance instead of adopting a 
punitive approach. For example, the policy includes a two-month probationary period for residents to 
reach compliance, in addition to allowing certain work-related activities to substitute for paid 
employment. Thus, at least in this instance, the imposition of public housing work requirements has not 
had the same impacts as those imposed in the TANF program discussed above.  
Finally, this paper has assessed residents’ perceptions of the work requirement – is it fair? – and 
how those subject to the policy have responded to it. More than 80 percent of survey respondents – 
including those impacted by the policy and those not subject to it – express general support for work 
requirements. Interviews of residents subject to the work requirement generally support this finding, 
although they would like to see the policy implemented flexibly. This finding suggests that most public 
housing residents have the same values concerning work as the larger society. Among those subject to the 
work requirement, over 80 percent of respondents indicated they had looked for employment, found a new 
or different job, enrolled in school or training, or worked more hours.  
While these findings clearly support the effectiveness of the CHA’s work requirement in 
increasing employment, our research has several limitations. For one, this study is not based on a 
random-controlled experimental design. Although we utilized propensity score matching to control for 
observed differences between the Treatment and Comparison Groups, unobserved characteristics could 
bias the results. The range of outcome variables is also limited: future research might assess work 
requirement impacts on mental or physical health, children’s behavior, or other outcomes. Another 
limitation is that this study has only looked at the short-term outcomes, and we hope that future research 
tracks work requirement impacts over a longer time period. What happens, for example, when those who 
have found work lose their jobs?  Will the same services be available to help them find a new one? 
Policy implications 
Given these limitations, we caution against drawing more general conclusions and believe it is 
premature to implement work requirements across the public housing program. In particular, several 
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aspects of how the CHA implemented the policy may be essential to the positive results. First, the CHA 
provided on-site case management and supportive services for over two years prior to imposing sanctions, 
and those services continued following enforcement. Second, the CHA delayed enforcement until the local 
economy had rebounded from the recent recession. Third, the CHA temporarily exempted residents 
identified as potentially having disabilities (but not officially classified as disabled), providing them an 
opportunity to apply for disability status. Fourth, the CHA’s sanctions allowed for a two-month 
probationary period (three months at the onset of sanctions) during which case managers worked with 
residents to achieve compliance. Moreover, the CHA allows residents to engage in “work-related activities” 
as short-term substitutes for paid employment. Overall, then, CHA staff members were focused on 
helping residents comply with the work requirement, not on evicting tenants.  
These issues also highlight potentially large obstacles to bringing work requirements to scale. 
Costs associated with providing case management and enhanced services to those in the work 
requirement sites were substantial. As a MTW participant, the CHA could shift funds from other 
program areas to pay for these services, but most PHAs do not have this flexibility. Moreover, we don’t 
know the type and amount of both case management and enhanced services that are needed to produce 
outcomes similar to those found in this study. How often should case managers communicate with 
tenants?  Which services are most important to positive work outcomes, and how long are these services 
needed before sanctions are imposed?  Implementing a work requirement without adequate supportive 
services may result in a much higher eviction rate. These and other questions should be addressed before 
work requirements are expanded to the entire public housing program.  
We also note that work requirement enforcement did not increase the average hours worked 
among those subject to it. This suggests that, while the policy was effective in increasing employment, 
newly-gained jobs were likely to be part-time work. It also suggests that hours worked, and presumably 
incomes, of households employed prior to enforcement did not increase. Thus, at least in this instance, the 
work requirement did not result in the kind of financial impact that would allow many residents to move 
out of public housing. The rents collected by the CHA, however, should have increased and positively 
contributed to the agency’s fiscal health. Whether the increase in employment was enough to 
meaningfully reduce concentrated poverty – or create a social milieu of work – is a question for future 
research.  
The MTW program offers a good opportunity to conduct additional research on work 
requirements and other innovations in the public housing program. Unfortunately, this program has not 
been implemented in a way that has produced such evaluations. As Congress debates both the 
reauthorization and expansion of MTW, it should mandate that participating PHAs evaluate the impacts 
of the innovations that substantially affect residents, such as work requirements. Further, Congress 
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should authorize additional funds to conduct such evaluations. Only through these means will we be able 
to understand the impacts of alterations in the public housing program on the tenants, PHAs, and the 
larger community.  
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